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ABStRACt Strategic political, technological, and economic choices concerning the future of
information and communications technologies are made in constant tension with everyday
life practices. Despite the friction that arises from these power relations, how human beings
relate existentially to technical objects may be a major factor in future outcomes of the so-
called Information Society. What is at stake here is a dialectical tension between the lived
world—the Lebenswelt, or the life-world experience—and existing technical systems. Given
this context of people’s relationships to technology, this article aims to advance phenomeno-
logical perspectives on digital media through a dialogue between Milton Santos’ geographical
approach to technical systems and Michel de Certeau’s theories about everyday life.
KEYWORDS  Information technology; Phenomenology; Cyberspace
RéSUMé  En matière de politique, de technologie et d’économie, l’être humain mise
stratégiquement sur l’avenir des technologies de l’information et de la communication dans
une tension constante par rapport à ses pratiques quotidiennes. Vu la friction causée par ces
relations de pouvoir, la manière dont chaque individu gère les objets techniques de son
existence pourrait jouer un rôle important pour l’avenir de la Société de l’information. Ce qui
est en jeu est une tension dialectique entre le monde vécu—le « Lebenswelt » ou « monde
vie »—et les systèmes techniques actuels. Dans ce contexte du rapport des humains à la
technologie, cet article propose une perspective phénoménologique sur les médias
numériques en mettant en contraste l’approche géographique de Milton Santos à l’égard des
systèmes techniques avec les théories de Michel de Certeau sur la vie quotidienne.
MOtS CléS  Technologie de l’information; Phénoménologie; Cyberespace
the adoption of information and communication technologies (ICts) within mostcontemporary social processes may be irreversible, but many of its outcomes are
still unpredictable. One may identify some trends here and there, but much of what
lies ahead depends largely on a series of decisions that must be made in the coming
decades (Benkler, 2006). there are technological, political, and economic choices that
will be made within more or less explicit hierarchies of power. these strategic options
exist in continuous tension with everyday life practices, which, in turn, serve to con-
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sistently reinvent the technologies that are deployed by It and telecom industries and
by governments at all levels.
If it seems reasonable to expect that future outcomes of ICt expansion may result,
for instance, from economic and political choices, one should not dismiss the ambi-
guity intrinsic to every human being’s most prosaic existential experiences of the world
and, for that matter, of technical objects. What is at the stake in these experiences is
the lived world—the Lebenswelt, or the life-world experience. Such a phenomenolog-
ical approach to ICts may open up new ways of revising methodologies, communica-
tion processes, information architectures, and even communications policies (see
Ciborra, 2002, 2004; Fay, Ilharco, & Introna, 2008; Ilharco, 2002; Josgrilberg, 2006;
Kozel, 2007). the phenomenology of ICt is often neglected, however, as researchers
tend to opt for discourse, critical, or systemic theories in their work. these theoretical
choices are perfectly rational, since a phenomenological approach might not be the
best option for thinking about the organization of power relations, for instance.
Nonetheless, to not take into account the Lebenswelt is to be blind to the genesis of
every signiﬁcation, that is, to ignore the ante-predicative perception of the world that
lies at the foundation of any human existential experience.
Given this special concern about everyday life practices, my goal here is to reﬂect
upon the dialectical tension between the incorporation of technical objects into social
life through speciﬁc power relations and the existential experience of the world. the-
oretically speaking, the aim is to shed light on the typical lack of theoretical resources
for applying phenomenological thinking when discussing power relations, and, addi-
tionally, to debate more thoroughly Milton Santos’ concerns about the intentionalities
of human beings and technical systems.1 By drawing on Santos’ theories, this article
will also highlight how a geographical approach to technical systems may be of value
to communications researchers.
the discussion that follows has as its object of inquiry the “digital locus” (Josgril-
berg, 2008), put forward in preliminary terms as follows:
the digital locus is a place, in Certeau’s sense (Certeau, 1990), organized by
strategies of power that articulate digital information and communication
systems and mobilize the symbolic and infrastructural dimensions of the
present technical period. It is a place wherein human beings are not only
submitted to pressures, even multiple determinations, but also recreate life,
create spaces. therefore, the digital locus is a site of fulﬁllment and the
struggle for survival. It has its social conventions and physical infrastruc-
tures that are systematically related to other previous systems and tech-
niques. (Santos, 2002)
the metaphor “digital locus” was born from an attempt to articulate two dimensions,
which should be comprehended together, despite the limits imposed by the linearity
of thought in a written text. these two facets are the existential relation developed
between human beings and technical objects and also the human action within a sys-
tem of techniques. this endeavour is facilitated by drawing on Santos’ approach to
technical systems and his very speciﬁc reference to phenomenology. Yet Santos’ work
has not developed this theoretical contribution in great detail, mostly because he
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opted to highlight other aspects of the subject matter, and as such, it warrants addi-
tional exegesis.
Existence and technical objects2
the existential relation developed between human beings and technical objects points
to a broader issue, namely, our existential relation with the world. Within the phenom-
enological tradition, one cannot reduce the relation between being and world to causal
relations; likewise, one should not reduce the relation between human beings and tech-
nical objects to causal relations either. this is exactly the problem of a certain positivist
objectivism, that is, the one that considers the world as a being-in-itself (en soi), leaving
to human beings the task of describing possible causal relations without subjective in-
terference. On the other hand, one cannot afford to hold an intellectualist position that
makes the world a being-for-itself (pour soi), where the belief in theoretical models lim-
its the possibilities of perceiving the world’s complexity. In phenomenology, being and
world are dialectical poles of a sole relation; hence, the world is there, becomes evident,
and is perceived by the being. this relation takes the shape of a chiasm.
Based on such an understanding of the world/being relation, the concept of in-
tentionality recovers the idea that every consciousness is a consciousness of something.
Here, if one wants to avoid the Cartesian inﬂuence inherited by the idea of a conscious-
ness, one may follow Ihde’s suggestion and consider the notion of “an actual-percep-
tual and culturally endowed” body, a body-in-action (Ihde, 1990, p. 12). Being is always
aiming toward the world (intentionality), which, in turn, becomes a permanent inten-
tional object. One may give more or less attention to some aspects of the world, but
the body’s movement toward the world is ceaseless.
the world, nevertheless, is not open to any possible sense. For instance, the dif-
ferent perceptions one has of a translucent or opaque object are not only intellectual
and culturally constructed elaborations, but also intuited from the object’s character-
istics itself. One should note that such an intuition, grounded on the sensible aspects
of the object, should not be taken for the object itself (Kelkel & Schérer, 1982). Every
perception is limited and developed as one explores different proﬁles of the object in
question. these perceptions occur in permanent dialectical tension with cultural val-
ues, meanings, and the “hardness” of the world. there is a difference, here, between
sense and meaning. the former stems from an ante-predicative perception of the
world, and the latter articulates a systematized knowledge through language, cate-
gories, and concepts.
likewise, the way one approaches a technical object is not isolated from other
physical and symbolic elements of everyday life. When entering an ofﬁce, other objects
rival with the perception I have of, say, a computer sitting on a desk. At the ofﬁce’s
doorstep, “l’ensemble se fait ‘vision’ et forme un tableau devant nous” (Merleau-Ponty,
1975, p. 21). little by little, I note differences between the various objects, establish con-
tiguities, explore some aspects and ignore others—here it is not a matter of psychoan-
alytical repression of some elements that remain unconscious, but the invisible aspects
that sustain the visible in the way Merleau-Ponty argues (Merleau-Ponty, 2006).
the same happens when I ﬁnally interact with the computer itself and its software.
the computer is perceived within a horizon that opens the possibility and, at the same
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time, limits my experience of it. the computer sitting on the ofﬁce’s desk affects me,
and it allows me to explore its different proﬁles; its evidence is a permanent unfolding.
the technical object affects me not in a causal sense, but as a “motivational solicita-
tion.” the emphasis lies on the being/world relation: a being endowed with intention-
ality and the possibility to drive its attention to certain aspects of the object and not
others (Steinbock, 2004).
A phenomenological comprehension of the being/world relation, or body/world
for that matter, between technical objects and humans, may be of great value for social
scientists exploring how information and communication technologies are used in
any given social process. When it comes to technical objects, however, one must con-
sider that they come with very speciﬁc rationalities and affordances, enabling and con-
straining speciﬁc uses and ways of doing things that transform the world and the
perception that human beings have of it. Intrigued by such a dialectical tension be-
tween technical rationalities and the experience of the Lebenswelt, Santos developed
some central aspects of his theories, such as the indissociable relation between human
action (being) and technical objects (world). As he writes, “[t]he action is as efﬁcient
as the objects are adequate. So the object’s intentionality is conjugated to the action’s
intentionality, and they both depend on the respective import of science and technique
present in the current territory” (Santos, 2002, p. 94). Again, what is at stake here is a
chiasm. Santos draws on Husserl’s philosophy to support his argument; however, de-
spite explicitly referencing Husserl, Santos never further developed his method for
using phenomenology to reﬂect upon technical systems. In a way, this article aims to
follow this trajectory, exploring such a theoretical weaving. While Santos has left the
door open to phenomenology, phenomenology has, in many cases, left the question
of power aside in order to make explicit the Lebenswelt as the genesis of every meaning.
Yet both endeavours are necessary and complementary.
to think in terms of an object’s intentionality, as Santos does, refers to its evidence,
which is in constant tension with my body’s intentional movement toward the object.
this intentionality, when speaking of technical objects, points not only to their physical
aspects but also to their rationality. When these intentionalities (the human’s and the
technical object’s) are smoothly conjugated, the most efﬁcient processes are deployed.
When one speaks of an object’s intentionality, it includes not only its “hardness,” that
is, the evidence that somehow indicates its possible uses, but also its rationality—
which brings another element into this discussion, namely, culture. As already men-
tioned, my perception of a computer in an ofﬁce is not isolated from the evidence of
its physicality, but the experience of the same computer is not isolated from culture
either, as I am in the world with other beings (intersubjectivity). Both physical and
cultural elements will constitute the horizon that opens the possibility of exploring
the technical object, but they will also limit my perception of it.
the technical object’s rationality derives from given technical systems, that is, the
series of “instrumental and social means” used by human beings to transform the world
(Santos, 2002, p. 29). Each technique uses different standardization strategies, bringing
into play methods and speciﬁc logics sustained by an appropriate discourse (Santos,
2002). the rationality of an object results from the articulation of all these elements.
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Methods, logics, and discourses belong to the realm of culture. therefore the perception
of a technical object and its use involve existential and pre-reﬂexive elements in dialec-
tical tension a world full of meanings articulated by different subjects. the world, or
the technical object, is perceived among other beings within a socially created culture.
A culture results from the marvellous and uncertain communication processes
that emerge from contingent perceptions of the world expressed by every individual’s
body. the world of communication is the world of expression. the being not only per-
ceives the world, but also expresses it through their body—spoken and written lan-
guages are just two means of expression among others. the body is “éminemment
un espace expressif” (Merleau-Ponty, 1975, p. 171). Every human gesture expresses a
speciﬁc relation to the world, a “corporeal scheme,” a “style that is unique.” this is
not a matter of linguistic expression only. For instance, when someone walks, their
body expresses a determined relation to the world, that is, the body counts on a solid
ﬂoor to keep walking. linguistic or artistic expressions (painting, music, et cetera) are
only some of my body’s expressive possibilities.
therefore the body is not only perceptive but also expressive, and other human
beings are also affected by my expressions in the same way as they affect me. I give
sense to the world and express it through my body. When it comes to my relation to
digital media, there, as well, I express through my body a unique relation to the tech-
nical object, developing a speciﬁc corporeal scheme with the devices I use (Kozel,
2007). the expression, in this case, is not only the way I speak of a digital device, but
also the way my body relates to it: for instance, the way I hold a mouse or how I type.
Our body expresses a unique relation with the device, a style that reveals our relation
with the world and with the object itself.
When I enter the ofﬁce and I am affected by the computer’s presence, I perceive
the technical object with all the possibilities of my body. the pre-reﬂexive perception
of the object is interwoven with received meanings about the computer or the ofﬁce
itself. the evidence of the world and how its elements affect my body work as points
of departure, as much as the language and cultures I inhabit. From the dialectical ten-
sion between received meanings and my pre-reﬂexive experience of the computer re-
sults my expression vis-à-vis the computer.
to make the discussion even more complex, it is important to also bear in mind
that the technical object is not only perceived, but I also perceive the world through
it. In this sense, the object is not only embodied by me, but also embodies me, although
one speaks of different kinds of interactants (Ihde, 1990). A prosaic example of this
phenomenon is how a blind person perceives the world through the tip of their cane,
which becomes an “appendice du corps,” an “extension de la synthèse corporelle”
(Merleau-Ponty, 1975, p. 178). In somewhat similar ways, I also perceive the world
through digital media, but this is only one among all possibilities my body has to en-
gage the world. therefore my body is my communication vehicle with the world, which
I perceive with all human sensitive possibilities (tactile, visual, auditory, et cetera) and
through different technical objects.
these different forms of engagement with the world do not articulate a sense
a posteriori, but stem from a common signiﬁcation, as the body is “un ensemble de
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signiﬁcations vécues qui va vers son équilibre. Parfois se forme un nouveau nœud de
signiﬁcations” (Merleau-Ponty, 1975, p. 179). technical objects, in turn, change my ex-
istential experience of the world. the novelty about present technical objects is that
they make previous unperceived worlds available to us, such as, for instance, a micro-
scope (Ihde, 1990). One could also think of new perceptions afforded by digital media
and the possibilities of augmented reality, combining “real world” and computer-gen-
erated data.
But what is the status of my perceptions and expressions of and through digital
media before other beings? Again, our subjectivity is fundamentally intersubjectiv-
ity. In the perceived world, I also perceive other beings through their gestures, lin-
guistic or not, which aim at the same world I do. Hence, I live the other being’s
presence as a “radical contradiction” (Merleau-Ponty, 1965, p. 104; 1999, p. 189) that
questions my perception of the world. If that is the case, the world can be afﬁrmed
only intersubjectively through communication. therefore, the social understanding
of the computer, or of any other technical object, stems from countless expressions
that occur within a society.
For instance, think of a journalistic interview on television with an It expert,
discussing a mobile phone. the television image represents the speaker’s expres-
sion, which I incorporate and express in my own style. Style here means a style of
being: the unique way in which each person exists and relates to the world, an ex-
istence built from all perceptual possibilities of the body, not only through language.
In the back-and-forth movement of social expressions, certain meanings attain a
sort of “equilibrium in movement” in that they embody the dialectical tension pre-
sented by the expressive power of each individual that incorporates those meanings.
When I perceive a mobile phone, I count on the immediate experience of being be-
fore the technical object, perceiving it both through the ante-predicative movement
of my body and through the expressions I incorporate from others (i.e., the inter-
view with the It expert). In the dialectical movement of expressions, the informa-
tion transmitted by the It expert offers a meaning that, as Merleau-Ponty argues,
is always in “sursis”: a “dotted image” of the mobile phone that I ﬁll in (Merleau-
Ponty, 1975, p. 83).
Yet despite the dynamic and uncertain movement of every communication
process, full of ﬁssures that allow for new meanings to emerge, one cannot dismiss
the fact that some social references are practically imposed by media, family, church,
unions, schools, or peer groups, such as a group of adolescents who perpetuate their
own slang and cultural values. Of course, these inherited and powerful meanings in-
ﬂuence much of my understanding of the world and are related to speciﬁc power re-
lations—particularly in the tech-world.
Even with that being the case, there is room for new expressions and language
use—if there were not, one could never distinguish a literary masterpiece from a
mediocre text. In other words, if two poets use the same vocabulary and grammar,
and are immersed in the same community, how in the world would it be possible for
them to produce extremely different works, evoking different feelings, even if they
dealt with the same subject matter? Here lies the beauty of expression, since the use
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of a given language is not simply a matter of social reproduction, even if the speakers
rely on an inherited language (Merleau-Ponty, 1975, 1999). language is only one pos-
sible way for my body to perceive the world. Furthermore, the way human beings use
language is far from being a mathematical equation—meaning is always in sursis.
It is precisely the richness of human beings’ indeterminate experiences of the
world, through structured and non-structured languages, that lies at the genesis of
every new technique—that is, the social and material means used by humanity to
transform the world. As a result, it is impossible to speak stricto sensu, for instance, of
a “digital society” or a “digital city,” since the world contains a multitude of techniques
being reinvented daily, regardless of the speciﬁc meanings promoted through the hype
surrounding digital media and how their use is shaping our world. More prudently,
one could talk about how human action is performed within a system of techniques
(Santos, 2002).
Life-world, control, and technical systems
the apparent universality of digital systems and their use is deceiving. there will al-
ways be a multitude of techniques available. Even if some speciﬁc techniques emerge
with a tendency toward becoming universal, they reﬂect nothing more than that, a
tendency, as they never reach an absolute status (Santos, 2002). 
take, for example, the case of latin America in the so-called Information Society.
Philosophically speaking, Calderon has already asked if it would not be more accurate
to talk in terms of tiempos mixtos (mixed times), where the pre-modern, the modern,
and the postmodern coexist (Calderon, 1987, 1993). Or, phrased in a more delightful
way, “why does the revolutionary Gabriel García Márquez write with a hygienic, elec-
tronic computer about the magic world of Mauricio Babilonia and his yellow butter-
ﬂies” (Calderon, 1993, p. 55)? What is happening in Márquez’s experience? Simply put,
there are multiple references and techniques at his disposal.
that is the reason why Santos speaks more accurately of a system of techniques
(Santos, 2002). In his words, life techniques are systemic, and so is their evolution. “A
group of techniques appears at some point, remains hegemonic for a period of time,
constituting the material foundation of society’s life, until another group of techniques
takes their place” (Santos, 2002, p. 176). What is new about the present period, accord-
ing to Santos, is the fact that hegemonic techniques are more often than not exogenous
to many communities. Both the technique’s rationality and its instrumental elements
are incorporated into the local reality according to speciﬁc power relations.
More precisely, Santos speaks in terms of “verticalities” and “horizontalities.” Ver-
ticalities are “vectors of a higher rationality and of a pragmatic discourse from hege-
monic sectors, creating a disciplined and obedient everyday life” (Santos, 2002, p. 285).
An example of verticalities is how most present technical objects and their respective
rationalities are forced upon local realities in latin America with the power of global
capitalism, in line with political and economic demands. these are the “externalities”
of the realm of “information,” as Santos refers to it, which literally comes from outside
and “lands” in the local community trying to integrate it all: the community and the
global technical systems. In the present state of affairs, there is a tendency toward in-
tegrating different loci vertically (Santos, 2002).
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the power of verticalities is put in dialectical tension with horizontalities, which
stem from a different logic, where multiple local solidarities occur (Santos, 2002). Hor-
izontalities are manifold in the realm of communication. Such a geographical under-
standing does not simply amount to a matter of “good” forces against “bad” forces,
but a recognition that there are social references that impose themselves thanks to
speciﬁc power relations. Even if what is at stake are “leapfrogging” processes toward
digital inclusion, which are presumably “good,” the Internet and the techniques sys-
tems it requires all constitute externalities vertically imposed to low-income or rural
communities. However, horizontal processes, which are submitted to vertical powers
as Santos acknowledges, function as “the place of blindness but also of discovery, of
complacence but also revolt” toward verticalities (Santos, 2002, p. 286).
Santos’ approach to technical systems is also inspiring for his investigations of net-
work geographies. His premise, based on the indissociable relation between instru-
mental and social means, is that networks are far from being balanced arrangements,
not even when their actors are under equal technological conditions. If the Internet is
taken as an example, it is easy to realize that there is more data ﬂow or content pro-
duction in some regions of the Internet than others, which means that people proﬁt
differently from the same infrastructure, even if the analysis is restricted to lANs (local
Area Networks). the unequal ﬂow is the outcome of different sorts of unbalanced sit-
uations, which may be not necessarily related to instrumental elements, but above all
to social aspects.
Santos thus addresses networked processes in terms of whether they are “fast” or
“slow” (Santos, 2002, p. 266). Fast and slow are not absolute, but relative terms (Santos,
2002). In other words, the deﬁnition of who is slow is dependent on who is to be deﬁned
as fast. Such relative differentiation is only possible when the social movement within
the network is taken into account, when the ﬂuxes, and not only the network’s nodes,
become relevant information concerning any given situation. this approach pushes
the analysis beyond the access debate, away from the purely instrumental perspective.
the network’s existence is inseparable from power relations, since current tech-
nical systems attribute privileged roles to only a few actors. An international ﬁnancier,
a multinational enterprise, or a world media tycoon can take more economic advan-
tage of the Internet than an ordinary person living in a poor neighbourhood, a fact
that forces a distinction between ﬁxed points or nodes of a network—elements por-
trayed with a deceiving sense of neutrality—and its ﬂuxes (Santos, 2002). One may
even say that the supposed equality between points in a distributed network, and the
social metaphors derived from that, may serve to perpetrate orthodox market argu-
ments and various capitalist distortions. the mantra is the same: with all points con-
nected, with no clear centre, following the same protocol will guarantee the network
(society) development.
the distinction between the nodes of a network depends largely on previous ex-
isting technical systems. While it is true that at every technical period (agricultural, in-
dustrial, technical-scientiﬁc-informational, et cetera) a group of techniques gains some
hegemony thanks to its capacity to articulate social and instrumental elements of a
society, it must also be noted that apparently less important techniques, remaining
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from other technical periods, may also coexist—while others may disappear or become
something else in the near future. these past technical arrangements that shaped a
society do not simply vanish with the emergence of a new group of techniques. Actu-
ally, somehow, they also guide the adoption of the arriving elements.
Santos called these past elements “rugosities.” these are the “remains of past di-
visions of labour (every scale in the labour division), the remaining kinds of capital
used and their technical and social combinations with labour” (Santos, 2002, p. 140).
Rugosities guide the adoption of new techniques vertically imposed, and they end up
pointing to the limits and possibilities of the new technical arrangement. It is easy to
spot how “rugosities” shape the adoption of new technical objects. For instance, one
may look at the different patterns of mobile phone usage in developed and developing
countries (Castells, Fernandez-Ardevol, linchuan Qiu, & Sey, 2006). Prepaid or con-
tract, intense SMS exchange or none, shared or individual mobile phones, these are
all patterns inﬂuenced by local memories, previous divisions of labour, and kinds of
social capital, and these are all processes whose geneses are found in speciﬁc embod-
iments of the world.
Verticalities and horizontalities, fast and slow, information and communication:
what is at stake here is a series of movements and social arrangements that force the
analysis to take into consideration the ﬂuxes within a network and the articulation of
previous technical systems. Fluxes will vary given the contingent existential situations
and rugosities whereupon the network establishes itself. therefore, as far as digital
media is concerned, there is a double and interrelated dialectical tension, namely, be-
tween the being and the technical object, but also between present and past technical
systems. Such a twofold understanding of how human beings inhabit the digital locus
puts into play both geographical and phenomenological approaches to technical sys-
tems, offering theoretical elements that might furnish a better comprehension of how
creative processes emerge in such a controlled environment. In both dimensions the
dialectical movement is open, that is, without a ﬁnal meaning of history. the dialectical
tension implies ﬁssures that allow for reinvention or creativity within a controlled en-
vironment, therefore forcing the research on digital media to think beyond social re-
production investigation strategies.
Of course, one cannot afford to be so naïve to the point of overlooking how hege-
monic practices inﬂuence social behaviour. Indeed many discourses are so powerful,
be they about technology or other subjects, that only a keen eye is able to see creativity,
reinvention of meanings, or new expressions escaping an existing “disciplinary appa-
ratus” (Foucault, 1975). Nonetheless, as even Foucault himself recognizes, “perhaps
the silence of the enemy … can also be the index of our failure to produce any such
fear at all” (Foucault, 1980, p. 84). Nonetheless, it is almost common sense that some
symbolic references have much more inﬂuence on social organization than others, as
is the case with media or schools. these major discourse articulators also inﬂuence
the way people use information and communication technologies, as current digital
devices are sold in light of discourses promoting the supposed need to be connected
“anytime, anywhere,” with the fastest access rates, not to mention the relationship be-
tween ICt and social status.
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As much as a phenomenological approach to digital media may beneﬁt from San-
tos’ theoretical contributions, especially since they provide a needed emphasis on is-
sues of power relations, Santos’ considerations about horizontal processes may in turn
beneﬁt from a deeper understanding of phenomenology, as I attempted to furnish in
the ﬁrst section of this article. Although Santos makes explicit reference to phenome-
nology, he does not develop these links fully, mostly as a result of paying attention to
other research interests, but not for lack of theoretical precision.
At the subjective level, another missing element in Santos’ theoretical approach,
as far as my own research interests are concerned, is a clearer understanding of “uses
of language” as a disruptive force against verticalities, a debate that can be found in
Michel de Certeau’s ideas about everyday life. Curiously, Certeau also refers to phe-
nomenology in crucial parts of his work, but as in Santos’ work, these references are
not fully developed in his text, as I argue later in this article.
In order to reﬂect upon the everyday life movements, Certeau does address the
issue of power in a nuanced way that may also complement Santos’ ideas about verti-
calities. Power, in this case, should not be taken as something necessarily bad or driven
by devious interests. there are no societies without “authorities,” that is, social com-
mon elements that make the existence of a group viable. these authorities, symbolic
or material, offer common references that allow for communication and creativity to
take place (Certeau, 1993). In Certeau’s words, authority is “tout ce qui fait (ou prétend
faire) autorité—représentations ou personnes—et se réfère donc, d’une manière ou
d’autre, à ce qui est reçu comme ‘croyable’ ” (Certeau, 1993, p. 17). In fact, from a phe-
nomenological point of view, everything is natural and cultural (Merleau-Ponty, 1975),
including the authorities. the digital locus is part of such authorities at different levels
of social articulation. Streets, individuals, laws, social conventions, buildings, languages,
telecommunication infrastructures and their rationalities may all be necessary author-
ities for the existence of any given social group. Every reference, in the sense of a source
of information socially constructed, is simultaneously natural and cultural. If some so-
cial elements have more symbolic power, this results from speciﬁc power dynamics
within the social group.
the systemic articulation of technical systems and their symbolic power estab-
lishes some authorities among other ones, providing a kind of structure for everyday
life from which to create spaces and reinvent life. What is important to retain is that
the limits of the digital locus are drawn solely for analytical purposes. From a phenom-
enological perspective, the existential experience of the digital locus is founded on my
body’s relation to the world as whole, and not solely within the digital environment;
again, my body as “un ensemble de signiﬁcations vécues qui va vers son équilibre”
(Merleau-Ponty, 1975, p. 179). If we are to speak of digital and analogical realms, for in-
stance, this experience is fundamentally “hybrid” (lemos, 2009), constituted by mul-
tiple techniques that are articulated in a system of systems (Santos, 2002). there is no
such thing as the experience of cyberspace in itself, but the experience is necessarily
hybrid, since human beings count on both cyberspace and physical spaces, on cultural
and material elements in and out of the cyberspace, to make sense of their existence
in the world.
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Certeau also used geographic metaphors to address the heterogeneity of social
processes. He deﬁned the organization of social reference points by power strategies
as a “place,” and this is the concept that inspires the idea of a “digital locus”—in a
way, this is also close to lemos’ concept of informational territories as “areas of digital
informational ﬂuxes control.” (lemos, 2009, p. 128) Note, however, that Santos and
Certeau use the concept of “place” differently. Santos’ idea of place is closer to Certeau’s
deﬁnition of space, as the ground where everyday life reinvents itself.
For Certeau, a place can be understood as a “conﬁguration instantanée des posi-
tions,” wherein the elements are organized in such a way that the movements inside
of it are not taken into account (Certeau, 1990, p. 173). A place is constituted by dis-
courses, images, physical infrastructures endowed with symbolic value, among other
elements, that make the existence of society possible. In a city, many places overlap.
there are places organized by religion, unions, media, public managers, but also by
families, gangs, and other social groups. What do they have in common? these places
are made possible only because of particular power relations that allow for some social
reference points to become authorities. there is no moral judgment here. Be it a
democracy or a dictatorship, an NGO or a violent street gang, there will always be social
reference points constructed by power relations. Every social group aims at some sort
of organization, to create its own place. Digital media, telecommunications infrastruc-
tures, and the discourses around them constitute a key part of many contemporary
societies’ places of social articulation and control.
the identiﬁcation of a place is possible only through strategies that impose limits
on the relations that are interwoven. the effort to identify a place is similar when it
comes to Santos’ verticalities. the novelty in Santos’ case lies in his recognition that in
the current state of affairs, these controlling elements are often exogenous to the local
reality. In any case, these limits are set for analytical or management purposes. It is
possible, for instance, to describe laws, discourses, physical structures, leaders, et cetera
of a religious movement. Nonetheless, these limits also belong to other places.
A text, for example, could be seen as the place the reader inhabits; the structured
language is inhabited by the speaker. An apartment is the dweller’s place. the stories
tV networks broadcast become a place to the receivers. the subjects count on different
places wherein life enfolds. therefore, places make the social existence of an individual
possible.
So what are the infrastructures and discourses about information technologies if
not a place among so many others? the group of techniques, infrastructures, and sto-
ries about current digital technologies constitutes a place, a digital locus that overlaps
with other places. It is not only a matter of telecommunications infrastructures, but
also of a great variety of meanings about the diversity of technical objects and the
social processes they promote. Among the meanings linked to the technical objects of
this period, one may include, for instance, stories about globalization processes, net-
worked societies, and so on and so forth. the conﬁguration of these instrumental and
social elements form the digital locus, that is, a place organized by particular power
hierarchies and strategies, with special inﬂuence in relation to major media groups,
telecommunication and It industries, and governments at all levels.
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What must not be forgotten is that ordinary people create their “spaces,” “un lieu
pratiqué” (Certeau, 1990, p. 173), in a silent and overlooked movement that reinvents
previous organizations of power. Not as a revolution, but as a movement that forces
the search for new strategies to maintain the place under control. this is the realm of
horizontalities in Santos’ work (2002). But how is it ever possible to reinvent such a
structured place, with a very speciﬁc rationality (in or out, 0 or 1), sustained by the
promotion of its artifacts through multiple narratives produced by the entertainment
and advertisement industry, journalists, researchers, educators, and governments?
to inhabit the digital locus does not mean to simply reproduce the established el-
ements of a place. Rather, it means to depart from such elements, to use them, bringing
the movement to an apparently stable form of social organization. to theorize about
spaces in the digital locus is an effort to apprehend a “croisement de mobiles.” What
is at stake is “l’effet produit par les opérations,” operations that have the digital locus
as a departing point (Certeau, 1990, p. 173). these movements, however, do not sys-
tematize their paths; they do not write a readable text that could easily be recovered
later. In other words, they do not sustain what they produce in a stable manner
(Certeau, 1990). to have them identiﬁed is to organize a place, as this depends on
power relations that will make them more or less stable social reference points within
a social group. However, as much as these are silent operations, they end up forcing,
at some point, some sort of social reorganization. this is essentially an open dialectical
process between the organization of places and the quiet reinvention of spaces.
the movement and reinvention of the digital locus is made possible thanks to,
among other aspects, the way human beings relate to the world, and, as Certeau high-
lights, the way language is used. to sustain his argument, Certeau relies on multiple
authors, such as ludwig Wittgenstein (meaning as use) and émile Benveniste (enun-
ciation), the tradition of rhetoric (tropes), and also on an acute understanding of the
important role played by oral relations and contingent memories in everyday life prac-
tices (Certeau, 1990). Certeau’s emphasis on language offers an important addition to
Santos’ (2002) approach, as the latter dedicates a greater deal of his work to under-
standing the life of technical systems and not so much to theoretically understanding
the nuances of everyday life.
Yet and again, Santos and Certeau will converge through their references to phe-
nomenology in their work, even though in both cases this theoretical gesture is not
fully explored. In Santos, drawing on Husserl, and as already discussed in this article,
the concept of intentionality is key to an understanding of the way human action relates
to technical objects. Certeau, in turn, makes an explicit reference to Merleau-Ponty’s
“espace anthropologique” (Certeau, 1990, p. 173), right after deﬁning his central concept
of space. “Il y a autant d’espaces que d’expériences spatiales distinctes,” writes Certeau,
quoting directly from Merleau-Ponty’s Phénoménologie de la perception (Certeau, 1990,
p. 174). Note that Certeau uses Merleau-Ponty’s ideas to deﬁne space, a key concept in
his theories of everyday life, while he rests most of the remainder of his argument on
theories of language use. Considering Certeau’s fastidious writing, the reference to Mer-
leau-Ponty is not accidental, in my view, as the former knew the latter very well, to the
point of writing a full paper in Merleau-Ponty’s homage (Certeau, 1982).
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The limits of theory
Phenomenology has much to proﬁt from this dialogue, particularly when it needs to
address power relations. Santos and Certeau offer an excellent theoretical foundation
to understand how different forces attempt to control and organize society, but not
without overlooking the dialectical pole, wherein other creative elements enter into
play. these counter-movements and logics are referred to by Santos and better ex-
plained by Certeau, who draws on a variety of theories about language. Nonetheless,
the novelty of the present technical period, as Santos observed, is that the controlling
and organizing forces, or verticalities, are more often than not exogenous to the terri-
tory. However, the missing link in Certeau’s and Santos’ approaches is the debate about
the pre-reﬂexive movements of the body or the phenomenological experience of the
world, notwithstanding the fact that both authors make explicit reference to phenom-
enology in very critical moments of their work.
the ambiguity of such dialectical movements—namely, places and spaces
(Certeau), verticalities and horizontalities, fast and slow (Santos)— is a useful analyt-
ical tool to better understand how the existential experience of using present-day tech-
nical objects is always inﬂuenced, but not determined, by given power relations. the
digital locus is just another place or vertical force imposed by hegemonic processes.
Nonetheless, examples of spaces or horizontal processes created in the digital locus
that escape the logic of control are everywhere. the same digitalization that favoured
the cheapening of the current recording industry’s production processes (strategies
and power relations) fed peer-to-peer MP3 ﬁle exchanges, thereby putting the same
industry at ﬁnancial risk. Or consider the telecommunications digital processes and
infrastructures (places) created by major phone operators to increase their proﬁts and
offer better services, which are simultaneously forcing this industry to review its strate-
gies given the increased use of VOIP.
In the corporate world, these unpredicted uses of the digital locus stem from very
speciﬁc and contingent situations, created by the undetermined existential experience
human beings have of the world. this is what frustrates, for instance, It consultants
in many enterprises. When it comes to decision-making, “management perception is
what shapes the ultimate thrust to action,” even though technology strategy is seen
“as the outcome of objective forces, such as market pull and technology push during
a given technological stage” (Ciborra, 2002, p. 130). take, for instance, the idea of a
networked ﬁrm. For Ciborra, the concept “synthesizes abruptly a chaotic organiza-
tional process, made of uncertainty in weaving alliances, their sudden upturns and
failures, their surprises and drifting, specially during implementation” (Ciborra, 2002,
p. 176). these failures and surprises in It management may have their genesis in the
user’s unique existential experiences of the world and in the existing rugosities, as dis-
cussed by Santos.
One can give yet another example: the use of new mobile phones. First, there is
the evidence of the technical object, within a speciﬁc cultural environment, that af-
fects me. It may even be the case that this affective exchange would occur ﬁrst
through language, and only later will I have access to the actual device—which is
what happens when a new mobile phone model is launched. the cultural environ-
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ment I live in, the material elements around me, including the mobile phone itself,
open the possibility for me to relate to the new device. From the theoretical perspec-
tive submitted here, there are pre-reﬂexive perceptions, the articulation of existing
meanings, the “rugosities,” and the “hardness” of the object itself that will somehow
indicate the conditions for me to use the device. All these elements are in constant
dialectical tension. the different proﬁles of a mobile phone emerge on the ﬂy, as I
use the object, and as my intuitions around the technical object are put in question
by other beings.
these theoretical inputs are important because, in the end, they may allow us to
readdress the limits of many metaphors such as network society, knowledge society,
Information Society, cyberculture, cyberspace, and, indeed, the digital locus itself. As
already mentioned, the limits imposed by preﬁxes such as cyber, or by words such as
network, digital, and so on, hold true only for analytical purposes. Sometimes these
limits are necessary to shed new light on some aspects of the subject matter, but, as
with every theoretical construct, their reaches are also limited, for they fall short of ac-
counting for an existential and dialectical experience of the world.
In sum, the possible senses of a new media artifact within the digital locus are in-
stituted by the tension between the technical object’s intentionality and the human
actions’ intentionalities, within a horizon that both affords and constrains the possi-
bility of every experience. Although current techniques are endowed with speciﬁc ra-
tionalities, the body movement toward the world institutes new meanings by way of
multiple signiﬁcations (cultural meanings and pre-reﬂexive senses) lived as a whole.
Oral relations, local memories, and the power of different signiﬁcations expressed
intersubjectively serve to open techniques and their technical objects to an indetermi-
nate number of articulations or uses. Be it in the streets of Bogotá, Colombia, where
citizens literally sell minutes of their personal mobile phones to passers-by, or in dif-
ferent collaborative social networks stimulated by scarcely known motives, techniques
are not doomed to be imposed exclusively by the most powerful actors.
In the current technical period, new techniques are likely to even radically alter
some economic premises of the past century (Benkler, 2006). Despite highlighting
and criticizing the economic and political powers deployed by capitalist globalization
processes, Santos calls these new social and instrumental means to transform the
world “sweet techniques,” as they are easy to learn, copy, and reproduce (Santos, 2001).
the Internet itself, as a distributed network, is a key element in the digital locus, facil-
itating reinvention as it “releases the emission pole” of current communication
processes—in comparison to previous media systems—and reconﬁgures the media
scene (lemos & Costa, 2007).
the genuine hopes expressed by lemos, Santos, Benkler, and within this very ar-
ticle, do not imply a naïve position toward digital media. In a distributed network,
from a formal point of view, every node both receives and sends information. However,
the supposed symmetry between nodes is illusory, since the Internet is not a world
apart from political and economic conditions—as apparent in all the debate about
governance, surveillance, neutrality, interoperability, and private infrastructure (back-
bones, et cetera), among other issues.
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to go straight to the point, what I argue here is for a dialectical understanding of
how digital media is incorporated into daily lives. At one side there is the lived experi-
ence of the world, phenomenologically speaking, the genesis of all possible meanings;
on the other dialectical pole is the systemic organization of techniques (instrumental
and social means), evolving under speciﬁc power relations, shaping and being shaped
by the Lebenswelt. By considering all these theoretical inputs, one may say that the
lived experience of the digital locus is partially unpredictable as it carries on the inde-
terminate relation of human beings to the world.
Notwithstanding the novelty brought on by digital media, my relation to technical
objects resonates with the universal and ambiguous human experience of perceiving
the world and expressing it through the body. Again, this is a chiasmic relation of em-
bodiment and being embodied by the world. Each individual develops a unique style
of engagement with any given technical object, whose evidence is intuited by the
body’s perceptive possibilities. the intentional body’s movement toward the digital
locus is marked by a dialectical tension between multiple elements, such as pre-reﬂex-
ive senses; the hardness of the world, including the material characteristics of each
technical object; culturally sedimented meanings intersubjectively expressed; and the
systematic arrangement of new and old techniques and their respective rationalities.
All these elements are part of everyday life practices and will indicate the limits and
possibilities of digital media. As such, the digital locus’s organization follows the similar
motives and strategies of other places. In that sense, the digital locus is just one place
among others where people reinvent life.
Notes
1. Milton Santos (1926-2001) is perhaps the most inﬂuential geographer in Brazil. His work been rec-
ognized particularly in latin America and in Europe, where he received the prestigious Vautrin lud
award in 1994. Santos was also given the title of doctor honoris causa in many universities, such as
toulouse, Barcelona, Complutense de Madri, and Buenos Aires, among others.
2. I am responsible for the translations of all quotes from texts in Portuguese.
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